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Footnotes 
1. THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, available at http://www.innocence
project.org (last visited May 9, 2012).
2. Often, these are cases of sexual assault plus robbery, or sexual
assault plus murder, but sexual assault is the common element
because that is where the DNA evidence is found. 
3. A special issue of LAW & HUMAN BEHAVIOR (volume 4, issue 4) in
1980 devoted to eyewitness behavior illustrates this early work. 
4. The system-variable concept in eyewitness identification was first
introduced in 1978 as a way of focusing the research experiments
on methods to improve the accuracy of eyewitness identifications
rather than simply showing that eyewitness identifications are
often unreliable. Gary L. Wells, Applied Eyewitness Testimony
Research:  System Variables and Estimator Variables, 36 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1546 (1978).
An increasingly strong case can be made for the argu-ment that mistaken-eyewitness identification is the pri-mary cause of the conviction of the innocent in the
United States. The strongest single body of evidence in support
of this proposition is the collection of cases in which forensic
DNA testing was used to exonerate people who had been con-
victed by juries and were serving hard time (some on death
row). These cases are well documented and tracked at the
Innocence Project website and, as of this writing, there were
267 fully exonerated cases, of which 203 (76%) were cases
involving mistaken-eyewitness identification.1
This set of DNA exoneration cases is extremely interesting
because simple math and logic indicate that the number of
undiscovered cases has to be much larger than 203. Consider
just two simple multiplying factors. First, these 203 exonerees
were the lucky ones for whom the DNA-rich biological evi-
dence was preserved post-conviction. Most cases that were
tried prior to the advent of forensic DNA testing can never be
tested because the biological evidence was never properly col-
lected or because it was destroyed, was lost, or has deteriorated
to a non-testable state. But perhaps the biggest factor of all is
that only a small fraction of cases can ever be solved with
forensic DNA testing to begin with. Virtually every DNA exon-
eration case among the 203 was a case of sexual assault.2 This
is not because sexual assault witnesses are poor eyewitnesses;
in fact, they are perhaps the best single category of eyewit-
nesses because they get a closer and longer look at the perpe-
trator than do victims of most other types of crimes. Instead,
the reason most DNA exonerations are almost exclusively
cases of sexual assault is because sexual-assault cases are the
ones that leave behind biological evidence (principally semen)
that can be tested for claims of innocence and exclusion. And
yet, sexual-assault cases account for fewer than 5% of all eye-
witness-identification cases. This fact alone means that the 203
exonerations figure needs to be multiplied by a factor of 20
(yielding 4,060 cases) to account for cases of eyewitness
misidentification for crimes in which there was likely no bio-
logical evidence. And even this number is a conservative esti-
mate because it assumes that the 203 discovered wrongful con-
victions represent the full number of wrongful convictions for
sexual-assault cases, which cannot be true because of the sex-
ual-assault cases for which the evidence was not properly col-
lected or was lost, was destroyed, or has deteriorated. Hence,
the 203 cases (which continue to grow) can only represent the
tip of a much larger problem. In addition, because forensic
DNA testing can only solve a small subset of criminal cases, it
means that we are still heavily dependent on eyewitness-iden-
tification evidence for solving crimes. 
Although members of the public and much of the legal sys-
tem generally think of the eyewitness-identification problem
as having been “discovered” via the forensic DNA exonera-
tions, psychological scientists were “blowing the whistle” on
eyewitness-identification evidence long before the advent of
forensic DNA testing, which only began in the 1990s. Starting
in the 1970s, cognitive and social psychologists began con-
ducting controlled experiments in which unsuspecting people
witness a staged crime and later have to try to identify the
“perpetrator” (actually an accomplice of the researchers) from
a lineup.3 Throughout the last half of the 1970s and continu-
ing to this day, psychological scientists have published these
experiments in peer-reviewed social science journals and have
derived a large number of conclusions and recommendations
based on a better understanding of how mistaken identifica-
tions happen. 
In the development of this social science literature on eye-
witness identification, psychological scientists have placed a
premium on a particular type of variable called a “system vari-
able.”4 System variables are those that affect the chances of
mistaken identification, but over which the criminal justice
system has control. For instance, a lineup in which the sus-
pect is the only one who fits the witness’s description of the
perpetrator increases the chances of a mistaken identification,
and this is under the control of the criminal justice system. In
contrast, there are variables that affect the chances of mis-
taken identification over which the criminal justice system
has no control but instead can only estimate their impact;
these are called “estimator variables.” An example of an esti-
mator variable is whether the race of the perpetrator matches
the race of the witness. Research consistently shows that
cross-race identifications are less reliable than are within-race
identifications, but the justice system cannot control whether
the race of the witness is the same versus different from the
race of the perpetrator. 
The system-variable versus estimator-variable distinction is
important because only system variables can inform the justice
system about ways to improve the accuracy of eyewitness iden-
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5. A sequential lineup is one in which the witness does not view all
members of the lineup at the same time (a simultaneous lineup)
but instead views one photo at a time and makes a decision on
that one before viewing the next. Research generally supports the
finding that the sequential procedure produces fewer mistaken
identifications. Nancy Steblay, Jennifer Dysart, & Gary L. Wells,
Seventy-Two Tests of the Sequential Lineup Superiority Effect:  A
Meta-Analysis and Policy Discussion, 17 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y. & L.
99 (2011).
6. A double-blind lineup procedure is one in which the person
administering the lineup is unaware of which lineup member is
the person of interest and which are merely fillers so as to prevent
the types of influence on the witness that are mentioned later in
this article. See GARY L. WELLS, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION:  A
SYSTEM HANDBOOK (1988).
7. Gary L. Wells, Amina Memon, & Steven Penrod, Eyewitness
Evidence: Improving Its Probative Value, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 45
(2006).
8. For a broad, general treatment of eyewitness-identification
research, see HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS PSYCHOLOGY (VOL 2):
MEMORY FOR PEOPLE (Roderick C. L. Lindsay et al. eds., 2007).
9. Gary L. Wells, The Psychology of Lineup Identifications, 14 J.
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 89 (1984).
tifications. Numerous jurisdictions have adopted a particular
“package” of lineup-procedure reforms based on psychological
scientists’ system-variable research—states such as New Jersey,
North Carolina, Ohio, and Wisconsin as well as places like
Dallas, Denver, Minneapolis, Boston, and Tampa, among oth-
ers. This package of reforms includes better ways to select
lineup fillers, better instructions to witnesses prior to their
viewing a lineup, the use of a sequential lineup procedure,5 the
use of double-blind lineup procedures,6 and the securing of a
certainty statement at the time of identification (prior to the
opportunity for extraneous factors to affect the witness’s cer-
tainty). All of these reforms are meant to increase the reliabil-
ity of the identification and are based on empirical evidence
that these system factors are critical to the chances that the
identification is mistaken.
For the most part, these system-variable findings and rec-
ommendations have been directed at law-enforcement agencies
because they are the ones in control of the procedures that are
used to collect eyewitness-identification evidence. But, as we
argue in this article, trial judges also play a very important role.
There is no guarantee that a given eyewitness identification
came from a lineup that followed procedural recommendations,
but once that identification evidence is presented at trial, it
makes a strong and compelling case against the defendant.
Research has found that jurors are likely to accept eyewitness
testimony as accurate as long as the eyewitness is confident and
consistent.7 Thus, it is critical that identification evidence is
evaluated with scrutiny to ensure that only reliable identifica-
tions make it into the courtroom to be heard by a jury. 
Trial judges are the ultimate arbiters of whether to accept
identification evidence as reliable. Commonly, this is played
out in a suppression hearing in which the defense might argue
that the identification was obtained in a way that was so sug-
gestive or otherwise problematic that it should be suppressed.
Accordingly, our goal in this article is to report some key sci-
entific findings regarding eyewitness identification that are rel-
evant to the trial court’s function of assessing eyewitness-iden-
tification reliability. In doing this, it is useful to remember that
reliance on the suppression hearing and the ruling of the trial
court regarding admissibility was fully in play for the 203 mis-
taken identifications that resulted in convictions and the
unknown number of others that (due to the absence of DNA
evidence) will never be detected. Just as in those cases, about
the only thing standing between a mistaken identification and
wrongful conviction is the ability of the trial court to make
effective rulings on the reliabil-
ity of eyewitness identifications
in pretrial hearings. 
SOME CRITICAL SCIENTIFIC
FINDINGS
The scientific literature on
eyewitness identification is too
large and vast to fully summa-
rize here. There are a number of
extensive published treatments
that are useful for a more com-
plete understanding of these
issues.8 Here, we extract some
of the more useful general prin-
ciples that help us understand
how mistaken identifications
and false certainty (being certain but mistaken) occur. Then, in
the next section (the Manson Test) we relate some of these gen-
eral observations to the task of the trial judge. 
RELATIVE JUDGMENTS
One of the staple conceptualizations of eyewitness-identifi-
cation errors is called the relative-judgment process. This con-
ceptualization holds that witnesses tend to make identifica-
tions from a lineup based on their judgments about who looks
the most similar to their memory of the perpetrator relative to
the other lineup members. Although this process often leads
witnesses to make accurate identifications when the culprit is
present in the lineup, it creates a dangerous situation when the
lineup does not contain the actual culprit because there is
always someone who looks more like the culprit than do the
remaining lineup members.9 The absence of the culprit in a
lineup simply means that the police have focused their inves-
tigation on the wrong person. It is an extremely difficult task
for a witness to detect the absence of the perpetrator in a
lineup, in part because the relative-judgment process does not
provide a mechanism by which witnesses may decide to
“reject” the lineup. To the extent that witnesses assume that
the police are showing them a lineup that contains the perpe-
trator, witnesses relying on a relative-judgment process will
tend to make positive identifications in instances in which
they should be saying, “It’s none of them.” There is no way to
know how often the suspect in the lineup is actually the cul-
prit, but because there is no reasonable-cause criterion to place
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“For the 
most part... 
system-variable 
findings and 
recommendations
have been
directed at law
enforcement
agencies[, but...]
trial judges also
play a very
important role.”
10. Gary L. Wells, What Do We Know About Eyewitness Identification?,
48 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 553 (1993).  
11. This test, and the functional-size versus nominal-size distinction,
has been in use since 1979 among eyewitness researchers. Gary L.
Wells, Michael R. Leippe, & Thomas M. Ostrom, Guidelines for
Empirically Assessing the Fairness of a Lineup, 3 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 285 (1979).
12. “Mock witnesses” are actually not witnesses at all. They are sim-
ply people who are given the verbal description of the culprit that
was provided by the actual eyewitness, and their task is to guess
which person is the suspect in the case. 
someone in a lineup (police can
conduct a lineup based on a
mere hunch), the number of
culprit-absent lineups being
shown to witnesses could
potentially be quite high.
Indeed, in all of the DNA exon-
eration cases involving eyewit-
ness identifications, the actual
culprit was not in the lineup
and the witnesses made identi-
fications nevertheless.
Perhaps the best evidence of
the operation of the relative-
judgment process is from
experiments that use the
“removal without replacement”
procedure.10 This procedure involves showing witnesses to a
staged crime one of two lineups. Some witnesses view a lineup
that contains a picture of the culprit among a set of filler pho-
tos, and other witnesses view the exact same lineup except that
the photo of the culprit is removed and is not replaced with
another photo. If positive identifications of the culprit in the
culprit-present lineup are a result of true recognition rather
than a relative-judgment process, then all of the positive cul-
prit identifications should shift to “not there” responses when
the culprit is excluded from the lineup. In an experiment test-
ing this idea, 200 eyewitnesses to a staged crime were shown
either a culprit-present lineup or a lineup in which the culprit
was removed without replacement. As Table 1 shows, the
majority of the witnesses who identified the culprit in a cul-
prit-present lineup would simply have identified someone else
(primarily #2, whose rate of identification went from 13%
when the culprit was present to 38% when the culprit was
removed) if the culprit had not been present. Hence, it seems
that rather than choosing the culprit because they genuinely
recognized him, witnesses simply chose whichever person best
fit their memory of the perpetrator.
The degree to which the suspect seems to fit the witness’s
memory of the perpetrator is highly dependent on the proper-
ties of the lineup itself. For example, if a lineup is somehow
biased against the suspect (i.e., the suspect stands out in some
way or the fillers in the lineup do not fit the witness’s descrip-
tion of the culprit), then the suspect will be the one who, rel-
ative to the other lineup members, is the most similar to the
witness’s memory of the culprit. Given what we know about
the relative-judgment process, a biased lineup drastically
increases the chances that an innocent suspect will be mistak-
enly identified. Accordingly, researchers have made a sharp
distinction between the nominal size of a lineup, which refers
to the number of photographs that are in the set, and the func-
tional size of the lineup.11 The functional size refers to the
number of fillers who make viable alternatives to the suspect,
and is calculated by taking the reciprocal of the proportion of
“mock witnesses”12 who choose the suspect from the lineup.
For example, if 50 of 100 mock witnesses choose the suspect
from a six-person lineup, the reciprocal is 100/50 = 2.0, thus
the lineup has a functional size of only 2; if 20 picked the sus-
pect, functional size would be 100/20 = 5.0, and so on. When
a lineup includes members who do not fulfill their role as
acceptable alternates to the suspect, the lineup is effectively
smaller than its actual size, and the risk of mistaken identifica-
tion is increased. For example, a six-person lineup in which
only three members fit the witness’s description of the perpe-
trator increases the risk of mistaken identification from one in
six to one in three. In a biased lineup, a relative-judgment
process will be even more likely to result in a positive identifi-
cation of the suspect, regardless of whether the suspect is the
perpetrator of the crime. 
One way to help witnesses avoid relying solely on a relative-
judgment process during the identification task is to make them
aware that the actual culprit may not be present in the lineup.
Researchers have demonstrated that instructing witnesses that
the culprit “might or might not be present” (sometimes called
a warning or a pre-lineup admonition) can greatly decrease the
rate at which mistaken identifications occur. In the original
study of instruction effects, 78% of witnesses who were not
explicitly warned that the culprit might or might not be present
made mistaken identifications from a culprit-absent lineup; in
contrast, the mistaken-identification rate dropped to 33% when
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“Given what we
know about
the relative-
judgment process,
a biased lineup
drastically
increases the
chances that 
an innocent 
suspect will be 
mistakenly
identified.”
TABLE 1. RATES OF CHOOSING LINEUP MEMBERS WHEN A CULPRIT IS PRESENT VERSUS REMOVED
LINEUP MEMBER
1 2 3 4 5 6 NO CHOICE
CULPRIT PRESENT 3% 13% 54% 3% 3% 3% 21%
CULPRIT REMOVED (WITHOUT REPLACEMENT) 6% 38% –– 12% 7% 5% 32%
*Culprit is in position 3 for culprit-present lineup and removed (without replacement) for culprit-absent lineup.  
Source:  Gary L. Wells, What Do we Know About Eyewitness Identification?, 48 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST, 553, 561(1993).
13. Roy S. Malpass & Patricia G. Devine, Eyewitness Identification:
Lineup Instructions and the Absence of the Offender, 66 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 482 (1981).
14. See the most recent meta-analysis (quantitative review) of the
sequential versus simultaneous difference. Steblay et al., supra
note 5, at 99-139.
15. Gary L. Wells, Mark Small, Roy S. Malpass, Steven Penrod,
Solomon Fulero, & C. A. Elizabeth Brimacombe, Eyewitness
Identification Procedures:  Recommendations for Lineups and
Photospreads, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 603 (1998). 
16. Gary L. Wells & Amy L. Bradfield, “Good, You Identified the
Suspect”: Feedback to Eyewitnesses Distorts Their Reports of the
Witnessing Experience, 83 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 360 (1998).
the eyewitnesses were given this warning.13 And it is not the
case that witnesses were simply choosing less in general; 87%
of the eyewitnesses accurately identified the culprit from the
culprit-present lineup after receiving the warning. Rather, the
instruction serves to alert witnesses to the possibility that the
culprit is not in the lineup. Thus, in cases in which the lineup
does not contain the culprit, witnesses who receive this instruc-
tion may be less likely to rely on a relative-judgment process to
make an identification. It should be noted that research using
the removal-without-replacement procedure described above
always included the “may or may not be present” instruction,
and witnesses still sometimes failed to detect the absence of the
perpetrator in culprit-absent lineups, thereby making inaccu-
rate identifications. However, the rate at which these mistaken
identifications occur is much lower when witnesses are given
this pre-lineup admonition, leading researchers to recommend
that all lineups include this instruction. 
The underlying theme that has emerged through the scien-
tific study of eyewitness identifications is that witnesses’ iden-
tification behavior is a reflection of multiple other factors
besides the strength of their memory. The makeup of the photo
lineup and witnesses’ expectations regarding the presence of
the culprit greatly influence identification choices, and
although the “may or may not be present” instruction cuts
down on mistaken identifications, witnesses still have a ten-
dency to rely on relative judgments. In an attempt to reduce
this tendency, researchers developed an innovative lineup pro-
cedure called the sequential lineup, which involves presenting
the lineup photos in a sequential fashion rather than simulta-
neously.14 Hence, the eyewitness views only one lineup mem-
ber at a time and makes a decision regarding each person
before viewing another lineup member. The theoretical basis of
this method is that it reduces the natural propensity for eye-
witnesses to make relative judgments. Compared to the tradi-
tional simultaneous procedure, the sequential procedure pro-
duces a lower rate of mistaken identifications with little loss in
the rate of accurate identifications. 
CERTAINTY (AND VIEW AND ATTENTION)
MALLEABILITY
Mistaken identification per se does not put an innocent per-
son at risk for wrongful conviction. Instead, it is a mistaken
identification from an eyewitness who is highly certain that
runs the high risk of wrongfully convicting the identified per-
son. The certainty that an eyewitness expresses in his or her
identification during testimony is the most powerful single
determinant of whether or not observers will believe the eye-
witness made an accurate identification.15 Accordingly, psy-
chological scientists have devoted a great deal of work in
recent years to figuring out how mistaken eyewitnesses end up
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being sure that they have made
a correct identification. Indeed,
every DNA exoneration case is
exactly like that; the witness
was mistaken but certain. 
When an eyewitness says, “I
am positive that the man sitting
in court is the man who robbed
me,” people naturally presume
that the witness is saying, “That
person sitting there so closely
matches my very good memory
for the perpetrator that I can
only conclude it is one and the
same person.” In fact, however,
witnesses often express this
high certainty not only when
the witnesses are mistaken but
also when they have identified
someone who does not look very much like the actual perpe-
trator at all. The key to understanding this problem is to rec-
ognize that eyewitnesses’ expressions of certainty in an identi-
fication are actually beliefs or feelings that they are right or
wrong about the identification they made. As such, these
beliefs or feelings can be influenced by a large number of fac-
tors that have little or nothing to do with the accuracy of the
identifications or how good a witness’s memory is. And as we
will describe below, these factors often come into play after
witnesses have already made an identification for which they
were actually quite uncertain. 
Given that witnesses’ certainty reports reflect a belief in the
likely accuracy of their identification, it is not difficult to imag-
ine that witnesses would feel more certain if they were told by
the lineup administrator that they “correctly” picked out the
suspect. Indeed, confirming feedback of this sort has pervasive
effects on eyewitnesses’ memory; not only does it inflate wit-
nesses’ current certainty, but it also distorts witnesses’ retro-
spective reports of how certain they recall having been at the
time of the identification as well as distorting their recollections
about the witnessing experience. This “post-identification feed-
back effect” was first demonstrated in an experiment in 1998,
in which 352 witnesses viewed a crime video and made mis-
taken identifications from a culprit-absent lineup.  Following
their identification, some witnesses were told “Good, you iden-
tified the suspect,” whereas others were not told anything.16 All
witnesses then answered a number of testimony-relevant ques-
tions about view (“How good was the view you had of the cul-
prit?” “How well could you make out details of the culprit’s
face?”), attention (“How much attention did you pay to the cul-
prit’s face?”), and certainty (“At the time of your identification,
“The certainty that
an eyewitness
expresses... 
during testimony
is the most 
powerful single
determinant of
whether or not
observers will
believe the 
eyewitness made
an accurate 
identification.”
17. Gary. L. Wells, Tamara. J. Ferguson, & Roderick. C. L. Lindsay,
The Tractability of Eyewitness Confidence and Its Implications for
Triers of Fact, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 688 (1981); Elizabeth Loftus
& Gary L. Wells, The Malleability of Eyewitness Confidence: Co-
Witness and Perseverance Effects, 79 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 714
(1994); John. S. Shaw III, & Kevin. A. McClure, Repeated
Postevent Questioning Can Lead to Elevated Levels of Eyewitness
Confidence, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 629 (1996). 
18. Geoffrey R. Loftus & Erin M. Harley, Why Is It Easier to Identify
Someone Close Than Far Away?, 12 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV., 43-
65 (2005).
19. Nancy M. Steblay, A Meta-Analytic Review of the Weapon Focus
Effect, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV., 413-24 (1992).
20. Christian A. Meissner & John C. Brigham, Thirty Years of
Investigating the Own Race Bias in Memory for Faces:  A Meta
Analytic Review, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y. & L. 3 (2001). One of the
best interpretations for the cross-race identification problem is
that when people see a face from their own race, they notice ways
in which it is different from other members of their own race,
whereas when they see a face from another race, they notice how
it differs from faces of people from other races. Daniel T. Levin,
Race as a Visual Feature:  Using Visual Search and Perceptual
Discrimination Tasks to Understand Face Categories and the Cross-
Race Recognition Deficit, 129 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 559
(2000). The latter strategy is, of course, totally ineffective for
picking the person from a lineup in which all members are the
same race as the perpetrator. 
21. Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight ≠ Foresight: The Effect of Outcome
Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL.:  HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 288 (1975).
how certain were you that you
identified the actual culprit?”).
Results of that first study and
dozens of subsequent studies
have shown that confirming
feedback strongly inflates wit-
nesses’ estimates of how good
their view was, how well they
could make out details of the
culprit’s face, how closely they
attended to the culprit during
the crime, and how certain they
recall having been at the time of
the identification. It is impor-
tant to note that these inflated
reports are distortions; after all, the feedback did not occur until
after the identification was made.
There are many other factors that can occur post-identifica-
tion that compromise the integrity of an eyewitness’s testi-
mony. For example, repeatedly questioning the witness, brief-
ing the witness about what questions might be encountered in
a cross-examination, and informing a witness that a co-witness
supposedly made the same identification decision have all
been found to inflate witness confidence, independent of iden-
tification accuracy.17 Furthermore, once a witness is exposed to
post-identification information of this nature, his or her ability
to revert to pre-feedback judgments regarding certainty, atten-
tion, view, etc., is, in effect, lost. And there is often no record
of whether this type of post-identification suggestion took
place, making it impossible to judge whether the witness’s ret-
rospective certainty report has been contaminated by new
information. For this reason, eyewitness researchers have
made two key recommendations in an effort to preserve wit-
ness confidence as an indicator of identification accuracy.
First, the lineup should always be administered by someone
who is kept “blind” to the identity of the suspect in the lineup.
It is well established in the psychological literature that a per-
son’s expectations can affect the behavior of others, whether it
be through inadvertent nonverbal communications or overt
suggestion. In the case of an identification task, the lineup
administrator’s knowledge or expectations about the suspect
could influence the manner in which the witness behaves. A
simple way to avoid this issue is to ensure that the person
administering the lineup is not aware of which lineup member
is the suspect (i.e., “double-blind” administration). Under
these conditions, the lineup administrator could not be a
source of external influence on the witness.  Second, a cer-
tainty statement should always be recorded immediately fol-
lowing the identification decision. A confidence measure taken
under double-blind conditions would provide a pure measure
of the eyewitness’s memory-based confidence. If the witness’s
certainty becomes inflated later on, then the initial measure of
certainty can provide a reference point for the witness’s true
confidence at the time of the identification.
THE ROLE OF MEMORY STRENGTH
As a general rule, all problems with eyewitness-identification
evidence are compounded when memory strength is weaker.
So, for example, the tendency to rely on relative judgments is
stronger when the witness has a weaker memory. Hence, the
removal-without-replacement effect, the influence of poorly
chosen lineup fillers, and the failure to properly instruct the
witness prior to the lineup are all more robust when the eye-
witness’s memory is weaker. Likewise, the post-identification
feedback effect is stronger when the witness has a weaker mem-
ory. Therefore, it is critical that trial judges appreciate the myr-
iad factors that contribute to weak memories. For instance, we
know that normal human vision does not permit a clear recog-
nition of faces from distances of more than about 200 feet (and
that assumes excellent lighting).18 The use of a weapon by a
perpetrator tends to impair memory for the perpetrator’s face
because it draws attention to the weapon and, hence, less time
is spent looking at the face.19 We know that cross-racial identi-
fication is less reliable than within-race identification because
of the ineffective strategies for processing faces of people from
another race than our own.20
Some variables that make eyewitness memory weaker might
seem at first glance to be common sense. But, as cognitive psy-
chologists have long documented, common sense has certain
illusory properties that permit it to “go both ways.”21 For
example, one might argue that if someone threatened or fright-
ened you, you would never forget that face and the person’s
image would become permanently ingrained in your memory.
It makes a certain common sense to accept that argument. But,
in fact, the opposite is true. Events that evoke fear and stress
actually impair memory for the details of the event, including
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22. Charles A. Morgan et al., Accuracy of Eyewitness Memory for
Persons Encountered During Exposure to Highly Intense Stress, 27
INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 265 (2004). 
23. Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
24. See Gary L. Wells & Deah S. Quinlivan, The Eyewitness Post-
Identification Feedback Effect: What Is the Function of Flexible
Confidence Estimates for Autobiographical Events?, 23 APPLIED
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 751 (2009), for a much more detailed analy-
sis of the problem with reconciling Manson with the science on
eyewitness identification. 
the face of the person who evoked the reaction.22 This too
makes common sense if one realizes that the primary response
to fear is “fight or flight,” which is an automatic self-preserva-
tion mechanism that absorbs the cognitive capacity of the per-
son and leaves little brain capacity for forming long-term
memories. Part of the reason that people generally buy the idea
that stress and fear produce better memory (when in fact they
produce poorer memory) is because of a confusion about the
level of memory that is operating. It is true that if someone
threatens you or points a gun at you, you will never forget that
the event happened. But that is not the same as having formed
a reliable memory for the details of the event, such as the pre-
cise facial characteristics of the perpetrator. 
The general principle that suggestion (e.g., from a biased
lineup or from post-identification feedback) has its greatest
effects when the witness’s memory is weaker needs to be kept
in perspective. Suggestion effects are likely to be moderated
only when the memory is extremely good. So, for instance, a
victim who is abducted by an unmasked person and held cap-
tive for hours or days in which the abductor’s face is in full
view is not likely to be easily influenced by suggestion regard-
ing the identity of the abductor. Generally speaking, however,
eyewitnesses see the perpetrator for only minutes, sometimes
even seconds, often under poor viewing conditions, while
frightened or confused, under cross-racial conditions, and so
on. Hence, the failure to properly instruct a witness prior to a
lineup, the use of fillers who do not fit the description of the
perpetrator, the failure to use double-blind procedures, and the
failure to secure a certainty statement at the time of the identi-
fication are serious problems in almost any eyewitness-identi-
fication case. 
ASSESSING RELIABILITY AT THE TRIAL-COURT LEVEL
Trial courts across the United States tend to rely on one or
another version of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1977 test as
spelled out in Manson v. Braithwaite23 (hereafter called Manson)
to make rulings in suppression hearings. Although many indi-
vidual states have their own version of Manson, the guidelines
all revolve around the same general proposition:  a two-
pronged test that inevitably rests on the “totality of the cir-
cumstances.” But within the language and process of the
Manson test rests a huge problem that has been identified by
eyewitness scientists.24 This problem helps explain why trial
courts are not likely to be able to weed out unreliable identifi-
cations using the Manson-type approach.
The Manson test functions as a two-pronged assessment
designed to evaluate the likely reliability of an eyewitness’s
identification. The first prong involves determining whether
the identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive to
begin with. Suggestive procedures include using a show-up
procedure when the police could have conducted a lineup,
conducting a lineup in which the suspect stood out, failing to
tell the eyewitness that the cul-
prit might not be in the lineup,
showing the witness a photo of
the suspect before conducting a
lineup, telling a witness that his
or her choice was correct, or
conducting a second lineup
procedure in which the only
person in common was the sus-
pect. If the procedure is not
believed to have involved sug-
gestion, then the identification
evidence is admitted. If the pro-
cedure is found to have contained unnecessary suggestion,
then the second stage of the test pits the distorting influence of
the suggestive procedure against five criteria intended to assess
reliability. These criteria include the witness’s opportunity to
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FIGURE 1. THE POST-IDENTIFICATION FEEDBACK
EFFECT:  PERCENTAGES OF EYEWITNESSES WHO
SCORED AT THE EXTREME (E.G., RECALLING THAT
THEY WERE TOTALLY CERTAIN) WITH AND WITHOUT
CONFIRMING FEEDBACK
view the offender, the witness’s
degree of attention during the
crime, the level of certainty
demonstrated at the time of
identification, the accuracy of
the witness’s description of the
offender, and the time elapsed
between the crime and the pre-
trial identification. The Manson
test is intended to determine
whether the identification,
despite having involved sugges-
tive procedures, is nevertheless
reliable.
There is nothing inherently
wrong with the idea that deter-
minations regarding the reliability of an identification should
be made by weighing a set of reliability factors against the sug-
gestion itself. However, when Manson was decided by the U.S.
Supreme Court in 1977, there was no scientific literature on
eyewitness identification. The factors spelled out to assess reli-
ability were based on the commonsense notions of the court at
the time and have since been found to perform quite poorly in
predicting reliability, especially for cases in which the identifi-
cation involved suggestive procedures. 
The first thing to note about these criteria is that three of
the five criteria are self-reports from the witness (view, atten-
tion, and certainty). Although there are occasions in which a
witness’s statement about view might be contrasted with objec-
tive measures (such as when a witness claims to have been 30
feet away whereas reconstruction of the crime scene shows the
distance to have been 100 feet), view is generally assessed sim-
ply by asking witnesses if they had a good view and could
make out details of the face. Similarly, attention and certainty
are subjective judgments and cannot be gauged against objec-
tive measures. There are a number of problems with people’s
estimates of their view, attention, and certainty. But our pri-
mary concern about these three self-report variables is that
they are inflated by the suggestive procedures themselves. The
use of suggestive procedures can lead the eyewitness to
enhance (distort) his or her retrospective self-reports in ways
that help ensure the witness’s high standing on these Manson
criteria, thereby leading to a dismissal of the suggestiveness
concern. The consequence of this is that the presence of sug-
gestion is likely to always result in admission of the eyewit-
ness-identification evidence. Manson is flawed in such a way
that the very presence of suggestive procedures at the time of
the identification will make it almost certain the witness will
pass the admissibility test.
The other two Manson criteria (description and time
elapsed) are not much better predictors of reliability. Studies
examining the relations between descriptions and identification
accuracy have found no meaningful correlation between the
two.25 What is perhaps most puzzling about using the match of
the witness’s description to the identified person as a measure
of reliability is that one would expect the identified person to
match the description; after all, it was probably because he or
she fit the description that a person was placed in the lineup in
the first place. But sometimes, the witness manages to identify
from a lineup a suspect who does not fit the initial description
of the culprit (e.g., the identified person has an apparent scar or
a tattoo that was not included in the witness’s prior descrip-
tion). After the identification is made, however, the witness’s
description may begin to change, now incorporating this aspect
of the person’s appearance into descriptions that are given later
on. It is for this reason that the judge and the court must be
very careful when assessing the match between the identified
person and the witness’s description, ensuring that the descrip-
tion being examined is the description that was given prior to
the occurrence of an identification procedure. Otherwise, there
is no way to distinguish between parts of the description that
were actually recollected from the witnessed event and ones
that were gleaned from the identification. 
As for the criteria concerning the time elapsed between the
crime and the pretrial identification, this factor in and of itself
should not be a primary component upon which reliability
evaluations are made. It is possible for a witness to positively
identify the perpetrator from a lineup two years after the crime
occurred, just as it is possible for the witness to fail to identify
the perpetrator only minutes after the crime occurred. The
important thing to know about memory as it relates to the pas-
sage of time is that the greatest drop in memory occurs very
soon after the witnessed event—even within minutes. Thus,
there may be little difference between a 1- and 2-day delay or
even a 30- and 60-day delay. Although the time elapsed
between the crime and identification can provide a reference
point to assess likely memory strength, it should not be treated
as a sole determinant of reliability.
It is important to highlight that the 203 DNA exonerations
of individuals who were mistakenly identified and wrongfully
convicted had the benefit of Manson when they were tried. The
framework of Manson makes it absurdly difficult to pinpoint
and exclude identifications resulting from even the most egre-
gious forms of suggestion, and it fails to provide an incentive
for law enforcement to reduce suggestiveness. In fact, we argue
that it may actually create an incentive favoring suggestive pro-
cedures. Suggestive procedures almost guarantee that witnesses
will pass the Manson test (because it will inflate their certainty,
attention, and view “scores”). If the use of suggestive proce-
dures rarely results in suppression of the identification, then
there is no reason for law enforcement to avoid using these pro-
cedures, especially since suggestive identification procedures
lead the witness to be more credible to the judge and jury at the
time of trial.  Hence, what incentive is there for law enforce-
ment to avoid suggestive procedures and, conversely, what are
the incentives to continue to use suggestive procedures? 
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When considering the predicament that has resulted from
the reliance on a Manson-type test for determinations about
identification evidence, it is useful to remember that full sup-
pression is not the only option for dealing with the presence of
suggestion. There are many other case-tailored alternatives
that can limit the testimony to those elements of the identifi-
cation that were likely uncontaminated by the suggestion. For
example, defense attorneys have the option of crafting motions
in limine to limit rather than totally exclude the identification
(e.g., not permitting the witness to testify about his or her cer-
tainty when post-identification feedback has contaminated
certainty). Other remedies that defense attorneys can ask for
include judicial instructions or expert testimony. Full admis-
sion without factoring in a cost for the suggestion not only
puts the accused individual at a risk of wrongful conviction
but also imposes no repercussions for the use of suggestive
procedures, thereby perpetuating the failure to deter law
enforcement from using these procedures.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Mistaken-eyewitness identification is the primary cause of
convictions of the innocent, and trial judges are one of the
safeguards that can prevent these miscarriages of justice. But
an effective trial judge needs more than a conventional legal
understanding of the problems associated with eyewitness-
identification evidence. A mature social science literature has
emerged that shows a tendency for conventional legal under-
standings (a) to fail to appreciate the power of suggestive pro-
cedures, (b) to rely too much on eyewitness-identification cer-
tainty, (c) to have faulty views of factors that impair memory,
and (d) to generally fail to create disincentives for suggestive
procedures.
Trial judges are the gatekeepers to the eyewitness-identifi-
cation evidence that is permitted in court. How are judges to
learn about the social science that can increase the sophistica-
tion of their admission decisions? Continuing judicial educa-
tion programs would be one way to learn more. The National
Center for State Courts, the American Judges Association, and
the American Judicature Society might also develop programs
that incorporate the social science literature on eyewitness
identification and disseminate that information through work-
shops, presentations, and written materials. For some eyewit-
ness cases, the use of eyewitness experts in court can be yet
another mechanism for judges to learn more about some of the
issues associated with eyewitness identification. But, the eye-
witness-identification literature is a highly specialized area in
scientific psychology, so simply drawing on the testimony of a
psychologist from a local community college would not neces-
sarily be a good idea. Generally speaking, a good eyewitness-
identification expert is one who has published research on eye-
witness issues in peer-reviewed journals and regularly
reviewed the published research of other eyewitness experts.
The use of an eyewitness expert at a pretrial hearing (rather
than or in addition to trial) can be particularly useful because
it affords the judge a relatively unconstrained setting (in the
absence of jurors) in which to question the expert.  In difficult
cases, the judge could then consider permitting the expert to
also testify at trial. 
There is a high cost to mistaken-eyewitness identifications.
Any time an innocent person is convicted, the guilty party goes
free, which is a fact that has played out visibly in the DNA
exoneration cases. Moreover, trust in the legal system hinges
very critically on its ability to avoid convicting the innocent, a
trust that has suffered some significant blows in the news sto-
ries that have surrounded the 203 (and counting) DNA exon-
eration mistaken-eyewitness cases. 
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